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JUDGES: Before GARRECHT, DENMAN, MATHEWS, STE-
PHENS, HEALY,
BONE, and ORR, Circuit [**2] Judges.
OPINION: [*775]
The petition herein which prays for present and 
future relief and costs is filed under authority of section 
24, subdivision 14, of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(14), 
n1 and section 43 of 8 U.S.C.A., n2 and is based upon alleged 
violations of petitioners’ civil rights as guaranteed by 
the 5th and 14th amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. No argument as to the application of the 5th amendment 
is made in this appeal and it need not be considered.
The petition contains allegations to the following effect. A num-
ber of minors (at least one each from each school division herein 
mentioned) for themselves and for some 5000 others as to 
whom the allegations of the complaint apply, n3 citizens of the 
United States of Mexican descent, who attend the public schools 
of the State of California in Orange
County, filed a petition by their fathers, as next friends, for 
relief against trustees and superintendents of several school dis-
tricts and against the superintendent and secretary and mem-
bers of a city board of education. Unless we shall indicate 
otherwise, our use of the terms ‘school districts’, ‘districts’ 
[**3] or ‘schools’ will be understood as inclusive of 
both district and city school territories [*776] or schools. The 
term ‘school officials’ includes all respondents.
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All petitioners are taxpayers of good moral habits, not 
suffering from disability, infectious disease, and are qualified 
to be admitted to the use of the schools and facilities within their 
respective districts and systems. A common plan of the school 
officials has been adopted and practiced, and common rules 
and regulations have been adopted and put into effect, whereby 
(using the words of the petition) ‘petitioners and all others of 
Mexican and Latin descent’ are ‘barred, precluded and denied’, 
‘attending and using and receiving the benefits and educa-
tion furnished to other children’, and are segregated in schools 
‘attended solely by children of ‘mexican and Latin descent’. 
To such treatment, petitioners and others in the same situation 
have objected, and they have demanded and have been refused 
admission to schools within their respective districts which they 
would attend but for the practice of segregation. ‘That by this 
suit and proceedings, petitioners seek to redress the deprivation 
by respondents herein (school [**4] officials) under color of 
regulation, custom and usage of petitioners’ civil rights, privi-
leges and/or immunities secured to them by the Laws of the 
United States, and guaranteed to each of them by the Laws and 
Constitution of the United States of America.’
To the petition, the school officials respond by a motion to 
dismiss for lack of federal court jurisdiction, because (to use 
the words of the motion) ‘this is not a suit at law or in equity 
authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the 
deprivation, under color of any law, statutes, ordinances, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state, of any right, privilege, 
or immunity, secured by any law of the United States providing 
for equal rights of citizens of the United States or of all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States,’ and because the 
‘petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ 
The motion was denied without prejudice to the assertion of 
any available legal defenses by way of answers to the petition. 
Respondents in their answer reassert their position as to the law 
in the motion to dismiss, and put in issue all of the allegations 
relating to the subject of segregation. n4 [**5]
After submission of the case for decision, the court filed its 
written opinion under the title ‘Conclusions of the Court’. n4a 
Thereafter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed, 
generally supporting petitioners’ complaint. Respondents ob-
jected to the Findings of Fact on the ground that the evidence 
showed without conflict school children of Mexican descent had 
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been and are being furnished with facilities fully equal to other 
school children, and that no finding had been made thereon. The 
court overruled the objection, and declined to make the request-
ed finding upon the ground that it is immaterial to the issue of 
the case.
Thereafter, a judgment was entered to the effect that all seg-
regation found to have been practiced was and is arbitrary and 
discriminating and in violation of rights guaranteed to plaintiffs 
by the Constitution of the United States. All respondents were 
enjoined against continuance of the segregation, and costs were 
entered against the several school districts. Respondents ap-
peal from the judgment upon eight points which may be stated 
simply as contentions that the District Court was and is with-
out jurisdiction over the subject matter because no [**6]  
substantial federal question is put in issue, and that suit is not 
authorized by law to redress the alleged deprivation of constitu-
tional rights and that the findings do not support the conclusions.
[*777] Summed up in a few words it is the burden of the peti-
tion that the State of California has denied, and is denying, 
the school children of Mexican descent, residing in the school 
districts described, the equal protection of the laws of the State 
of California and thereby have deprived, and are depriving, 
them of their liberty and property without due process of law, as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. n5
Respondents are officers of the State of California in the De-
partment of Education of that state, and as it will hereinafter be 
[*778] shown their action under the intendment of the Four-
teenth Amendment is the action of the state in all cases where 
such action is taken under color of state law. We must, there-
fore, consider the questions: Are the alleged acts done under 
color of state law, and do they deprive petitions of any constitu-
tional right?
The jurisdictional question is implicit in these two questions.
It is said [**7]  in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 
773, 776, that ‘ * * * the court must assume jurisdiction to de-
cide whether the allegations state c cause of action of which the 
court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact aris-
ing in the controversy.’ Therefore, the District Court was right in 
taking jurisdiction.
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Were the acts complained of performed under color of state 
law, or since there is not dispute that the law of California does 
not authorize the segregation practiced, are the acts merely 
personal to the actors and in no sense state acts? That the acts 
complained to have been and are being performed under color 
of state law has been conclusively and affirmatively answered 
in principle in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Ange-
les, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S.Ct. 312, 57 L.Ed. 510, wherein it was 
claimed that the officer complained of was a state agent and the 
state could not be held responsible for acts of the agency not 
within the terms of the agency. We quote from page 287 of 
227 U.S., at page 315 of 33 S.Ct., 57 L.Ed. 510 of the opinion: 
‘In other words, the proposition is that the Amendment (Four-
teenth [**8] Amendment of the Constitution) deals only with the 
acts of state officers within the strict scope of the public powers 
possessed by them, and does not include an abuse of power by 
an officer as the result of a wrong done in excess of the power 
delegated. Here again the as the result of a wrong done in excess 
of the power delegated. Here again the settled construction of 
the Amendment is that it presupposes the possibility of an abuse 
by a state officer or representative of the powers possessed, and 
deals with such a contingency. It provides, therefore, for a case 
where one who is in possession of state power uses that power 
to the doing of the wrongs which the
Amendment forbids, even although the consummation of 
the wrong may not be within the powers possessed, if the 
commission of the wrong itself is rendered possible or is ef-
ficiently aided by the state authority lodged in the wrong-
doer. That is to say, the theory of the Amendment is that where 
an officer or other representative of a state, in the exercise of 
the authority with which he is clothed, misuses the power 
possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amen dment, inquiry 
concerning whether the state has authorized the wrong [**9]  
is irrelevant (as to the point under discussion), and the Federal 
judicial power is competent to afford redress for the wrong by 
dealing with the officer and the result of his exertion of power.’ 
See Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 24 S.Ct. 502, 
48 L.Ed. 737; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 
L.Ed.
497; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 86 L.Ed. 
1453.
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The latest case upon the subject to which our attention has been 
called in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 
L.Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330. That case is
a criminal one, and treats of a criminal statute implementing the 
Fourteenth Amendment as 8 U.S.C.A. § 43 implements the Amend-
ment in our case. The principles to be applied are the same. At 
page 111 of 325 U.S., at page 1040 of 65 S.Ct., 89 L.Ed. 1495, 162
A.L.R. 1330 of the opinion it is said: ‘We are not dealing here 
with a case where an officer not authorized to act nevertheless 
takes action. Here the state officers were authorized to make 
an arrest and to take such steps as were necessary to make the 
[**10] arrest effective. They acted without authority only in the 
sense that they used excessive force in making the arrest effec-
tive. It is clear that under ‘color’ of law means under ‘pretense’ 
of law. Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pur-
suits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to 
perform their official duties are included whether they hew to 
the line of their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested, the 
statute was designed to embrace only action which the State in 
fact authorized, the words ‘under color of any law’ were hardly 
apt words to express the idea.’ See United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368, wherein the court said: 
‘Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made 
possible only because the wrongdoer  [*779] is clothed with the 
authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.’
It is clear of doubt that the acts complained of in the instant 
case pertain to the subject of the respondents’ power and duties. 
Respondents, in immediate charge of the schools, have limited 
authority to receive or reject persons presenting themselves as 
pupils, and while acting to [**11] receive or reject, they are act-
ing within the general scope of such authority whether the acts 
are right or wrong. The denial of school privileges to persons 
in certain schools upon the sole ground of their Mexican 
ancestry. by respondents is not ‘in the ambit of their person-
al pursuits’, but are acts undertaken in the performance of their 
official duties. However, the respondents ‘did not hew to the 
line of their authority’; they overstepped it. To the same intent 
are the following quotations from Home Tel. & Tel., supra, ‘ * 
* * the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment * * * generic 
in their terms are addressed, of course, to the states, but also to 
every person * * who is the repository of state power.’ At page 
286 of 227 U.S., at page 314 of 33 S.Ct., 57 L.Ed.
510. ‘The subject must be tested by assuming that the officer 
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possessed the power if the act be one which there would not be 
opportunity to perform but for possession of some state authority.’ 
At page 289 of 227 U.S., at page 315 of 33 S.Ct., 57 L.Ed. 510.
We hold that the respondents acting to segregate the school 
children as alleged in the petition [**12]  were performing un-
der color of California State law.
The court found that the segregation as alleged in the petition 
has been for several years past and is practiced under regula-
tions, customs and usages adopted more or less as a common 
plan and enforced by respondent-appellants throughout the men-
tioned school districts; that petitioners are citizens of the United 
States of Mexican ancestry of good moral habits, free from 
infectious disease or any other disability, and are fully qualified 
to attend and use the public school facilities; that respondents 
occupy official positions as alleged in the petition.
In both written and oral argument our attention has been direct-
ed to the cases in which the highest court of the land has upheld 
state laws providing for limited segregation of the great 
races of mankind. In Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 
Mass., 198, n6 a law providing for the segregation of colored 
school children was held valid in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, but that 
equal facilities must be provided for the use of the colored chil-
dren. Chief Justice Wallace of the Supreme Court of California 
in Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am.Rep. 405, [**13] followed 
with approval. Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 
20 S.Ct. 197, 44
L.Ed. 262, reaffirmed the principle. In Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 
U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172, the principle of the 
Roberts case, supra, was followed in the opinion written by 
Chief Justice Taft and affirmed the State Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi in its application of the ‘colored’ school segregation 
statute to an American citizen of pure Chinese blood. Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256, was upon 
the right of the state to require segregation of colored and while 
persons in public conveyances, and the act so providing was 
sustained again upon the principles expressed by Chief Justice 
Shaw. This list of cases is by no means complete.
It is argued by appellants that we should reverse the judgment 
in this case upon the authority of the segregation cases just cited  
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[*780]  because the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the 
states to provide for segregation upon the requirement that equal 
facilities be furnished each segregated group. Appellees argue 
that the segregation cases do not rule the instant case. There is 
argument [**14] in two of the amicus curiae briefs that 
we should strike out independently on the whole question of 
segregation, on the ground that recent world stirring events 
have set men to the reexamination of concepts considered fixed. 
Of course, judges as well as all others must keep abreast of 
the times but judges must ever be on their guard lest they ratio-
nalize outright legislation under the too free use of the power 
to interpret. We are not tempted by the siren who calls 
to us that the sometimes slow and tedious ways of democratic 
legislation is no longer respected in a progressive society. For 
reasons presently to be stated, we are of the opinion that the 
segregation cases do not rule the instant case and that is rea-
son enough for not responding to the argument that we should 
consider them in the light of the amicus curiae briefs. In the first 
place we are aware of no authority justifying any segregation 
fiat by an administrative or executive decree as every case cited 
to us is based upon a legislative
act. The segregation in this case is without legislative support 
and comes into fatal collision with the legislation of the state.
The State of California has a state-wide free school [**15] 
system governed by general law, the local application of which 
by necessity is to a considerable extent, under the direction of 
district and city school boards or trustees, superintendents and 
teachers.
Section 16601 of the California Educational Code requires the 
parent of any child between the ages of eight and sixteen years 
to send him to the full time day school. There are some few 
exceptions, but none of them are pertinent here. There are no 
exceptions based upon the ancestry of the child other than those 
contained in Secs. 8003, 8004, Calif.Ed.C. (Both repealed as of 
90 days after June 14, 1947.), which includes Indians under cer-
tain conditions and children of Chinese, Japanese or Mongolian 
parentage. As to these, there are laws requiring them in certain 
cases to attend separate schools. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio 
Alterius. It may appropriately be noted that the segregation so 
provided for and the segregation referred to in the cited cases 
includes only children of parents belonging to one or another 
of the great races of mankind. n7 It is interesting to 
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note at this juncture of the case that the parties stipulated that 
there is no question as to race segregation in the [**16] 
case. Amicus curiae brief writers, however, do not agree that 
this is so. Nowhere in any California law is there a suggestion 
that any segregation can be made of children within one of the 
great races. Thus it is seen that there is a substantial difference 
in our case from those which have been decided by the Supreme 
Court, a difference which possibly could be held as placing our 
case outside the scope of such decisions. However, we are not 
put to this choice as the state law permits of segregation only as 
we have stated, that is, it is definitely confined to Indians and 
certain named Asiatics. That the California law does not include 
the segregation of school children because of their Mexi-
can blood, is definitely and affirmatively indicated as the trial 
judge pointed out, by the fact that legislative action has been 
taken by the State of California to admit to her schools, chil-
dren citizens of a foreign country, living across the bor-
der. Calif.Ed.C. §§ 16004, 16005. Mexico is the only foreign 
country on any California boundary. n8
It follows that the acts of respondents were and are entirely 
without authority of California law, notwithstanding their [*781] 
performance [**17] has been and is under color or pretense 
of California law. Therefore, conceding for the argument that 
California could legally enact a law authorizing the segregation 
as practiced, the fact stands out unchallengeable that California 
has not done so but to the contrary has enacted laws wholly 
inconsistent with such practice. By enforcing the segregation 
of school children of Mexican descent against their will and 
contrary to the laws of California, respondents have violated 
the federal law as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution by depriving them of liberty and 
property without due process of law and by denying to them the 
equal protection of the laws.
It may be said at this point that the practice of California law in 
California State Courts, and this may be so but the idea is of no 
relevancy. Mr. Justice Douglas made this point clear in the case 
of Screws v. United States, supra, when he said that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not come into play merely because the 
federal law or the state law
 [**18] ‘ (Emphasis ours.) And it is as appropriate for us to say here, what 
Mr. Justice Douglas said in a like situation in the cited case, ‘We agree 
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that when this statute is applied (in our case when Sec. 41(14) of 28
U.S.C.A. is applied) it should be construed so as to respect the proper bal-
ance between the states and the federal government in law enforcement.’    
Punishment for the act would be legal under either or both federal and 
state governments. United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, S.Ct. 103, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102. However, since the prac-
tice complained of has continued for several consecutive 
years, apparent to California executive and peace officers, and contin-
ues, it cannot be said that petitioners violated Mr. Justice Douglas’ admoni-
tion in taking their action in a federal court.
In the view of the case we have herein taken the contention that the Find-
ings of Fact do not support the Conclusions of Law and the Judgment is 
wholly unmeritorious. The pleadings, findings and judgment in this case 
refer to children of ‘mexican and Latin descent and extration’, but it does 
not appear that any segregation of school children other than those of 
Mexican [**19] descent was practiced. Therefore, we have confined our 
comment thereto. If the segregation of all children of Latin descent and 
extration in addition to those of Mexican descent were included in the 
practice and the plan, its illegality would, of course, be upon the same 
basis as that herein found. In addition, however, the impossibility of there 
being any reason for the inclusion in the segregation plan of all children of 
Latin descent and extration and the palpable impossibility of its enforce-
ment would brand any such plan void on its face. n9
Affirmed.
DENMAN, Circuit Judge (concurring
I concur in what is said in the court’s opinion but cannot agree 
with the omission of the consideration of Lopez v. Sec-
combe, so widely discussed in the profession. I am also of 
the opinion that we should not place a primary reliance upon 
Home Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, which in particulars relevant 
here is overruled by the Snowden and Screws cases. The prec-
edent of the recent decision in *782 Snowden v. Hughes, infra, 
states the law as it now is, with requirements for violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment not mentioned in the court’s 
opinion. 
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(1) Lopez v. Seccombe, Mayor of the City of San Bernardino, 
California, D.C., S.D.Cal., 71 F.Sup  p. 769.
What our decision here does is to follow the precedent of 
Judge Yankwich’s decision in the Lopez case. It is not only in 
Orange County that public officers are guilty of such perver-
sions of the “privileges long recognized at common law as es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”[1] 
In an adjoining county a similar discrimination was made 
not only against the descendants of Mexican nationals but 
of descendants, adult and infant, of all nationals of Latin 
countries.
San Bernardino established a public park and recreational 
ground with an area containing a swimming pool and bath 
house. The mayor, city councilmen, chief of police and park su-
perintendent, all through their agents, barred from their entry 
into the area all persons of Latin descent. The exclusion was 
not merely of Mexicans but of all Latins, that is of people from 
the score or more Latin American Republics and from Italy, 
Spain and Portugal, as the outstanding character of persons 
actually excluded makes clear.
The Reverend R. N. Nunez is a Catholic priest of Mexican 
ancestry. Eugenio Nogueros is from Porto Rico, of Latin ances-
try, a college graduate, who is an editor and publisher. Igna-
cio Lopez another newspaper editor is of Mexican descent a 
graduate of the University of California, recently the head of 
the Spanish Department in the Office of Foreign Language, Di-
vision of Office of War Information, and the Spanish speaking 
director of the Office of Coordinator of inter-American affairs 
at Los Angeles, California. All are citizens of the United States. 
The two editors were taxpayers contributing to the support of 
the facilities denied them.
All three sought admission to the park area and its facilities 
and were excluded therefrom because of their Latin descent. 
This was not a mere casual error of a minor official at the park. 
The priest and the two editors and each of them on sev-
eraloccasions protested to these city officials and requested 
their permission to enter these public facilities but, because of 
their
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Latin descent, such permission was denied them.
In the case of Lopez et al. v. Seccombe et al., supra, the 
priest and the two editors, suing for themselves as Ameri-
can citizens and eight thousand (8,000) other San Bernardino 
persons of Latin descent, sought an injunction against the 
mayor, councilmen, chief of police and park superintendent 
for such discriminatory exclusion. The case was tried by Judge 
Yankwich who ruled, as in the instant case, that such discrimi-
natory barring of the class of Latin descended people 
violated the due process and equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of the discrimination as to 
all persons of Latin descent were found,=as above stated, and 
an injunction issued against the eight office holders.
783
In the San Bernardino case the answer of the officers denied 
the exclusion of the *783 plaintiffs. In the instant case these 
Orange County trustees, public officers sworn to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the 
State of California,[2] brazenly proclaim their guilt in 
their discriminatory violation of the state educational laws. 
What is overlooked in the court’s opinion is the fact that the 
appellants themselves declare they have violated their 
oaths of office and, in effect, say, “Well
what are you going to do about it?” for their brief states
“The situation in California as conclusively shown by the re-
cord is:
“1. The legislative department of the State has clearly and ex-
pressly prohibited the establishment of separate schools for
Mexican pupils.
“2. The Judicial Department of the State has emphatically de-
clared it to be unlawful to establish separate schools for Mexi-
can pupils (Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54).”Cali-
fornia is a state as large as France and having a population 
at least a fifth as large as that of the United States when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. All the nations of the 
world have contributed to its people. Were the vicious prin-
ciple sought to be established in Orange and San Bernardino 
Westminster, an un/doc  75
Counties followed elsewhere, in scores of school districts the 
adolescent minds of American children would become 
infected. To the wine producing valleys and hills of northern 
counties emigrated thousands of Italians whose now third 
generation descendants well could have their law-breaking 
school officials segregate the ,descendants of the north 
European nationals.
Likewise in the raisin districts of the San Joaquin Valley to 
which came the thousands of Armenians who have contrib-
uted to national prominence such figures as Saroyan and Haig 
Patigan. So in the coastal town homes of fishermen, largely 
from the Mediterranean nations, the historic antipathies of 
Italian, Greek and Dalmatian nationals could be injected and 
perpetuated in their citizen school children.
Or, to go to the descendants of an ancient Mesopota-
mian nation, whose facial characteristics still survived in the 
inspiring beauty of Brandeis and Cardozo the descendants of 
the nationals of Palestine, among whose people later began 
our so- called Christian civilization, as well could be segregat-
ed and Hitler’s anti-semitism have a long start in the country 
which gave its youth to aid in its destruction.
It is to such school officials, who so violate their oaths 
of office and openly break both the state and federal laws 
and who set such an example to the boys and girls, that these 
adolescents are entrusted to grow up in the American way 
of life. In this connection it should be noted that Section 19 of 
the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 51, under which Screws was 
prosecuted, makes a felony of the same wrongdoing for which 
the succeeding Section 20, 18 U.S.C.A. § 52, creates the civil 
remedy here given by this court. As justice Rutledge’s opin-
ion at page 119 of 325 U.S., at page 1044 of 65 S.Ct., 89 L.Ed. 
1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330, of the Screws case states, they are “twin 
sections,” in which there are “no differences in the basic rights 
guarded.”
It is in accord with the long established precedent of Anglo 
Saxon judges to call to the attention of the prosecuting au-
thorities facts appearing in litigation before them which 
may warrant the consideration of an indictment. Following 
that custom, the attention of the senior judge of the South-
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ern District of California and the foremen of its grand juries is 
directed to the facts here disclosed.
(2) As the law is today it is not enough that a state official vio-
lates the state or federal law in the manner described in Hom-
eTelephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 282, 
33 S.Ct. 312, 57 L.Ed. 510, to bring him within the due process 
and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
On the facts shown in the opinion of the Supreme Court the 
City of
Los Angeles today would not be held to have violated that 
Amendment.
784In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401, 88 
L.Ed. 497, the Supreme Court determined the boundary 
line of cases of officials’ violations of state law within and 
without the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not enough that the 
federal or state law is violated. In addition either the law 
must be not “fair on its face” or *784 there must be an 
“intentional or purposeful * * * discriminatory design to favor 
one individual or class over another” in administering the law. 
There, where an Illinois election board, in claimed violation 
of Illinois law, had failed to certify a citizen as a duly elected 
nominee for a state office, it was held that he was not denied 
the equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was 
not because he had a remedy under the state law but because 
that law was not discriminatory on its face and there was no
    showing of the board’s intentional or purposeful discrimination of a 
“particular class.” In holding the Amendment not violated, the Court, 
at page 8 of 321 U.S., at page 401 of 64 S.Ct., 88 L.Ed. 497, states the 
distinction between a mere incidental violation of a non-discriminato-
ry state law and a purposeful “class” discrimination, as follows:
“The unlawful administration by state officers of a state stat-
ute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application 
to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial 
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of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it 
an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This 
may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to 
a particular class or person, cf. McFarland v. American Sugar 
Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 87, 36 S.Ct. 498, 501, 60 L.Ed. 899, 
or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a dis-
criminatory design to favor one individual or class over anoth-
er not to be inferred from the action itself, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 373, 374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1072, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220. * * 
*” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Los Angeles telephone case the sole finding of fact 
was that the city authorities had established a telephone rate 
which was confiscatory. On this alone it was held that the city 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. There could be no find-
ing that the law authorizing the rate fixing was not “fair on 
its face.” Nor was there any finding of the city’s purpose-
ful discriminatory design to favor one individual or class over 
another.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 
1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330, upholds the validity of the twin section 
19 of the Criminal Code against the charge of a vagueness so 
complete that it fails to describe a crime, by construing it 
to apply only where (at page 107 of 325 U.S., at page 1038 of 
65 S.Ct.) the parties charged “had the purpose to deprive the 
prisoner of a constitutional right,” there “the right to be tried 
by a court rather than by ordeal.” “For the specific intent re-
quired by the Act is an intent to deprive a person of a right 
which has been made specific either by the express terms of 
the Constitution  or laws of the United States or by decisions 
interpreting them.” Page 104 of 325 U.S., at page 1037 of 65 
S.Ct.
In three respects the instant case is even stronger than the 
Screws case. There the killing of the prisoner was held no 
more than a possible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and punishable in the federal courts though also punishable 
under the state law. There the law under which the arrest was 
made was “fair on its face” and the case was returned to 
the jury to be tried under a proper instruction as to whether 
the “intent” with which the killing was committed was to 
violate that Amendment. Here the regulation shows “on its 
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face” the denial of equal protection of the California laws, 
prevention of which is the very purpose of that Amendment. 
Here the “intent” so to deny such protection by the enforce-
ment of the regulation is proclaimed in the briefs to this court.
(3) Since the applicable criterion is whether the segregating 
regulation of each district is discriminatory and not fair on 
its face, it is pertinent that they clearly fail even to give 
equal facilities to the children in the two classes of schools.
The teacher of a class of both English and non-English speak-
ing pupils is not the same facility to the English speaking 
pupils that the same teacher would be to a class made up 
entirely of those speaking English. There is diverted to the 
teaching of English to the Spanish speaking pupils much of 
the teacher’s professional energy and time which otherwise 
would be given to an English speaking class. The district court 
inferentially so holds in its finding XI,
“English language deficiencies of some of the children of Mex-
ican ancestry as such children enter elementary public school 
life 785 beginners may justify differentiation by public school 
authorities in the exercise of their reasonable discretion as to 
the pedagogical methods of instruction to be pursued with 
different pupils, and foreign language handicaps may be 
to such a degree in the pupils in elementary schools as to 
require separate treatment in separate classrooms * * * Om-
nibus segregation *785 of children of Mexican ancestry from 
the rest of the student body in the elementary grades 
in the schools involved in this action because of language 
handicaps is not warranted by the record before us.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)  This court judicially is aware that a century 
ago when California was taken over by the United States, the 
majority of its population was Mexican. Four generations of 
these people have been educated in English speaking schools. 
To these should be added the third and second generations 
of succeeding Mexican immigrants to California. A very large 
percentage of the present day school children descended 
from Mexican nationals is English speaking. Many of those 
of older established families do not speak Spanish. All such 
children are discriminated against by the impaired facility 
of the teacher, occupied with teaching English to their class-
room associates — as compared with those attending schools 
of English speaking pupils.
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[1] Section 41. (Judicial Code, section 24, amended.) Original jurisdiction. 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: * * * (14) Suits 
to redress deprivation of civil rights. Fourteenth. Of all suits at law or in eq-
uity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the 
deprivation, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunities, secured by the 
Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the 
United States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”
[2] “§ 43. Civil action for deprivation of rights
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.”
[3] Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 
723c as to class suits.
[4] It is alleged in the answer that a large number of school chil-
dren concerned are unfamiliar with and unable to speak the English 
language. Other affirmative defenses are alleged but they need not be 
mentioned for the reason that the findings of fact are not attacked and the 
appeal is based upon the question as to whether or not petitioners’ 
civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States have been violated.
[4a] The author of this opinion deems it appropriate to note that 
the case was tried to the distinguished Senior Judge of the Southern
District of California, Honorable Paul J. McCormick.
[5] As to the protection and deprivation of liberty and property without 
due process of law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256; Bell’s Gap. 
R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 10 S.Ct. 533, 33
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L.Ed. 892; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31, 25 L.Ed. 989. We quote from 
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92, 21
S.Ct. 43, 44, 45 L.Ed. 102: “The act in question does undoubtedly discrimi-
nate in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if founded 
upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is valid. Of course, if such dis-
crimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and 
made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, 
political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connec-
tion with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be 
pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less 
favored classes.” And in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 
131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas.1917B, 283, Mr. Justice Hughes, as an associ-
ate justice, speaking for the court said: “It is sought to justify this act [an act 
limiting employment of aliens] as an exercise of the power of the state to 
make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, 
morals, and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admit-
ted authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it 
implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to deny to 
lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means 
of earning a livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the 
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was 
the purpose of the Amendment to secure. [Cases cited.] If this could be 
refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of 
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be 
a barren form of words.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 
67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446: “`No state * * * shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ [Fourteenth Amendment.] 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 
Following this portion of the Meyer case are cases cited: In re\laugh-
ter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House 
Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111
U.S. 746, 4 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 10
S.Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 
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L.Ed. 832; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539,
49 L.Ed. 937, 3 Ann.Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 
14, 53 L.Ed. 97; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 
549, 31 S.Ct. 259, 55 L.Ed. 328; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 S.Ct. 337, 62 
L.Ed. 772, Ann.Cas.1918E, 593; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 S.Ct. 662, 
61 L.Ed. 1336, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, Ann.Cas.1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dodge, 246 U.S.
357, 38 S.Ct. 337, 62 L.Ed. 772, Ann.Cas.1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 
U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375; Adkins v. Children’s Hospi-
tal, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238; Wyeth v. Cam-
bridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86
N.E. 925, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 147, 128 Am.St.Rep. 439. See also, Farrington v. Tokush-
ige, 273 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646; and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468. See exhaustive 
discussion in Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54.
[6] The decision in the case of Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, cited 
in the majority opinion in the above entitled case (April 14, 947), was not 
founded directly upon a state statute. A state statute granted certain dis-
cretionary powers to an elected School Committee, but these powers did 
not specifically provide for any segregation of school children on the basis 
of race or color. However, Boston had long conducted separate schools 
for colored school children. Shortly before institution of the case (the case 
antedated the Civil War), which was for damages allegedly suffered by the 
plaintiff, a colored child, for being excluded from the school nearest her 
residence, the School Committee had adopted a resolution approving the 
policy of continuing the separate schools. The decision in the case upheld 
the acts of the Committee. (Stephens, C. J.)
[7] Somewhat empirically, it used to be taught that mankind was made 
up of white, brown, yellow, black and red men. Such divisional 
designation has little or no adherents among anthropologists or 
ethnic scientists. A more scholarly nomenclature is Caucasoid, Mongoloid 
and Negroid, yet this is unsatisfactory, as an attempt to collectively sort all 
mankind into distinct groups.
[8] The right of children to attend schools organized under laws of the 
state has been termed a fundamental right. See Wysinger v. Crookshank, 
82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54. Education “is a privilege granted by the state constitu-
tion, and is a legal right as much as is a vested right in property.” 23 Cal.Jur. 
pp. 141, 142. In the same volume, p. 161: “It is now settled that it is not in 
violation of the organic law of the state or of the nation to require children 
in whom racial differences exist to attend separate schools, provided the 
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schools are equal in every substantial respect. But only in the event such 
schools are established may children be separated in respect of race. And 
no separation
may be had, in the absence of statutory or constitutional authority there-
for.”
[9] The case of Lopez v. Seccombe, D.C. S.D.Cal., 71 F.Supp. 769, cited and 
commented upon in the concurring opinion, went to uncontested judg-
ment upon stipulation, and is supported alone by formal findings of facts 
and conclusions of law. No discussion of principles appears in the record, 
no opinion or memorandum was filed, and no counsel in the instant case 
mentioned it in his brief, notwithstanding the same lawyer was chief coun-
sel in both cases. (Stephens, C. J.)
[1] “While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty 
thus guaranteed [by due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment], 
the term has received much consideration and some of the included 
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individ-
ual [1] to contract, [2] to engage in any of the common occupations of life. 
[3], to acquire useful knowledge, [4] to marry, [5] to establish a home and 
bring up children, [6] to worship God according to the dictates of his 
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long rec-
ognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men. — [Citing cases.]” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 
625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, holding a law prohibiting the teach-
ing of foreign languages in school violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
[2] “I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be,) that I will 
support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
the State of California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties 
of the office of * * * according to the best of my ability.” Constitution of 
California, Article XX, Section 3.
